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With the development of capital market, the relationship between companies’ 
governance mechanism and their auditor choice decision gradually draw people’s 
attention. According to the classical agency theory, the companies with serious agency 
conflicts will seek for high quality auditor. However, most of the early studies based 
on China’s capital market showed that there was little proof of demands for high 
quality auditing service in listed firms, and state ownership was the critical reason for 
the lack of effective auditing demands. When refer to each specific feature of 
corporate governance, the researchers also did not get the same conclusions. 
Therefore, with a sample of split-share reformed companies, this dissertation analyzes 
the relationship between governance mechanism and auditor choice more 
systematically and meticulous under different ownership concentration, controlling 
stake properties and institutional environment. 
This study finds that: there is a nonlinear relationship between ownership 
concentration and the choice of big 10; state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more 
incentives to choose high quality auditors, among them: SOEs with profit state 
shareholders are more likely to choose high quality auditors, and central SOEs are 
more likely to choose big 10 compared with firms directed by other non-profit 
organizations; the same post arrangement of chairman and CEO shows weak negative 
correlation with the choice of big 10; generally, there is no evidence that the 
proportion of independent directors has relation with high quality auditor, however, 
the situation changes on the background of different share arrangement, controlling 
stake properties and institutional environment; refer to managerial stockholding, no 
matter in full sample or sub sample, it has no significant relationship with high quality 
auditor choice. 
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